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Economic Perspective 1 
THE COAL DISPUTE AND THE NEW EMPLOnCNT LHGISLATIOM 
John Gennard 
Department of Industrial Relations 
The Dispute 
Since the beginning of the 1980's the 
marke t fo r c o a l has c o n t r a c t e d 
dramatical ly, with the National Coal 
Board's (NCB) disposals f a l l ing by more 
than 16m tonnes annually in the four years 
to March 1984. The Board's response had 
been to s tockpile coal - but a t a cost . 
By 1983 i t was paying £125m a year in 
financing the stock whilst s t i l l producing 
8m tonnes a year in excess demand. In the 
f i n a n c i a l y e a r 1983/84 under t h e 
chairmanship of Sir Norman Siddal l , 15 
p i t s were closed and 18,000 miners were 
made redundant. By October 1983 - af ter 
Mr MacGregor had t a k e n over t he 
chairmanship of the NCB - the Board and 
the unions had begun to consider the 
problem of over-capacity. 
On 6 March 1984 Mr MacGregor met National 
Union of Mineworkers' (NUM) leaders to 
inform them of his plans for the future of 
the industry. These plans stressed the 
need for an orderly contraction to take 
account of the change in the market since 
the development of the or ig inal Plan for 
Coal agreed by Government, unions and the 
NCB in 1974. Over the f inancial year 
1984-85 the new plan envisaged a reduction 
of output by 4m tonnes to 97.4m tonnes per 
annum. This, the NUM, inferred would 
require the closure of 20 p i t s and the 
loss of 20,000 jobs . Meanwhile in South 
Yorkshire , the area d i r e c t o r , under 
i n s t r u c t i o n s to cut back c a p a c i t y , 
proposed the c l o s u r e of Cortonwood 
co l l i e ry , which had a l i f e expectancy of 
only five years but to which a substantial 
number of miners had r e c e n t l y been 
transferred from other closed p i t s . The 
NUM. alleged tha t the area d i rec tor had 
'jumped the gun' and acted in breach of 
the co l l ie ry review procedure. So began 
the dispute. 
On 9 March the NUM Executive voted to give 
official sanction to strikes due to s tar t 
in Scot land and Yorkshire over the 
' c l o s u r e 1 p l an , and extended t h e i r 
approval in advance to other areas of the 
union considering taking action against 
p i t closures. In the dispute, the NUM i s 
seeking (1) the NCB's withdrawal of i t s 6 
March proposal, (2) that the NCB keep open 
Cortonwood plus four more p i t s which i t 
claims are marked for closure, and (3) 
tha t the Board should not be allowed to 
close pits on economic grounds but only on 
those of exhaus t ion or geo log ica l 
difficulties. At the time of writing the 
NUM had j u s t rejected the ' l a s t ' offer 
from the NCB. The Board had offered to 
reconsider i t s 6 March proposals, that the 
five p i t s would remain open and be put 
through the closure review procedure in 
common with a l l other p i t s and that a 
fresh independent appeals body would be 
appointed to which closure matters could 
be referred by any party and to whose 
judgements 'due weight' would be given. 
Breaches of the Employment Acts in the 
Dispute 
The dispute to date has seen breaches of 
the secondary picketing and secondary 
indus t r i a l action provisions of the 1980 
Employment Act and has not fu l f i l l ed the 
c r i t e r i a of a lawful trade dispute as 
defined in the 1982 Employment Act. Under 
t h i s l a t t e r Act o r g a n i s a t i o n s and 
individuals affected by i l l e g a l trade 
union ac t ion may sue the union as a 
corporate body for compensation for losses 
suffered from such action. Nonetheless, 
few firms or individuals have resorted to 
the new l ega l p rov i s ions to ob ta in 
p r o t e c t i o n from a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l 
economic losses as a r e su l t of the NUM's 
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behaviour in the dispute. So far the role 
of the courts in the s t r i ke has been 
confined to the enforcement of the 
criminal law with respect to violence 
against individuals and police officers on 
picket l ines , and the use of the common 
law by some i n d i v i d u a l NUM members 
alleging the incorrect application of 
procedures for ca l l ing s t r i ke s as la id 
down in the union's area and national rule 
books . For example , t he p r e s e n t 
sequestration of the NUM's national funds 
stems from a successful plea by working 
miners aga ins t the Derbyshire and 
Yorkshire areas of the NUM. The court 
ruled that s t r ike action in these areas 
was unconsti tut ionally called and should 
not therefore have been declared official 
by the National Executive of the NUM. The 
NUM nationally was ordered by the court to 
cease issuing ins t ruc t ions to miners in 
those areas not to cross picket lines. I t 
did not comply with t h i s order and a 
contempt of court fine was then imposed on 
the national union. I t fa i led to pay 
t h i s , whereupon the court ordered the 
sequestration of i t s funds and assets. 
The 1980 Employment Act res t r ic ts lawful 
picketing to an employee's own workplace 
although union o f f i c i a l s are allowed to 
p icke t the workplaces of those they 
represent. Striking miners going to other 
p i t s within the i r area or outside i t to 
picket are thus in breach of the Act. The 
NUM have also placed pickets outside 
premises belonging t o the r a i l w a y s , 
Br i t i sh Steel , the E lec t r ic i ty Board and 
certain ports in order to prevent the 
delivery of coal, a l l of which i s i l legal 
under the 1980 Act. By doing so the NUM 
exposed i t s e l f t o l e g a l ac t ion from 
amongst others, the National Coal Board 
("flying" pickets going to areas where 
miners were s t i l l working), the Br i t i sh 
Steel Corporation (e.g. pickets outside 
the Ravenscraig Steelworks), the Bri t ish 
Railways Board, the Central E lec t r ic i ty 
Generating Board (e.g. pickets outside 
power s t a t i o n s ) , and var ious por t 
a u t h o r i t i e s , (e.g. the Clyde Port 
Authority with respect to pickets a t 
Hunterston). 
However, with the exception of a High 
Court injunction granted to the NCB on 11 
March to stop Yorkshire miners picketing 
other pi ts , no use of the employment laws 
was made by these organisations. Notwith-
standing the fact that on 17 March the NCB 
was given leave to bring a contempt of 
court action against the Yorkshire area of 
the NUM for defying t h i s in junc t ion 
against secondary picketing, the Board 
decided not to proceed. However, in April 
1984 two Gloucestershire road haulage 
companies were granted an in junc t ion 
against the South Wales area of the NUM 
prohibit ing secondary picketing by i t s 
members outside the Port Talbot steelworks 
in South Wales which was preventing the 
haul iers delivering coal there. This 
injunction was ignored, and on 31 July the 
High Court fined the South Wales area NUM 
£50,000 for contempt of cour t and 
subsequently ordered the seizure of i t s 
funds. There have also undoubtedly been 
breaches of the 1980 Act's secondary 
action provisions as the resu l t of r a i l , 
t r a n s p o r t and s t e e l unions ' members 
agreeing to ban the movement of coal. 
However, these provisions, with the i r 
complicated tes ts for secondary action to 
be lawful (e.g. f i r s t customer, f i r s t 
supplier etc.) have not been tested in the 
dispute. 
The 1982 Employment Act redefined a lawful 
trade dispute, to require that i t relate 
wholly or mainly to the terms and 
conditions of employment, thus excluding 
inter-union disputes and disputes relating 
solely to matters occurring outside Great 
Br i ta in , and r e s t r i c t i n g lawful disputes 
to those between an employer and his own 
employees. This l a s t named provision 
makes disputes between an employer and a 
trade union where the employer has no 
dispute with his own employees i l l e g a l . 
The coal dispute has witnessed breaches of 
t h i s provision of the Act. For example, 
in May 1984 a day of stoppages in support 
of the miners was undertaken by various 
unions in Scotland, who had no dispute 
with their own employers. Similarly, on 
27 June 1984, railway workers in London, 
despi te having no dispute with the i r 
employer, staged a 24 hour s t r ike - with 
l imited impact - in support of the NUM. 
The second national dock s t r ike to occur 
during the coal dispute took place in late 
August and was ostensibly over the use of 
non-registered dock workers to unload a 
coal boat (the Ostia) a t Hunterston in 
Scotland. There was a strong feeling that 
t h i s was perhaps an 'excuse to take 
suppor t ive ac t ion over the miners ' 
d i s p u t e , but again no o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
attempted to t e s t the lega l i ty under the 
Employment Acts of t h i s second dock 
s t r ike . 
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Reasons for the L i t t l e Use of the 
Employment Acts 
Managements and t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
generally welcomed the disputes provisions 
of the Employment Acts as a useful 
instrument in evening up a perceived 
imbalance of bargaining power in favour of 
the unions . However, i t was always 
unlikely that large corporations with 
established industr ial r e la t ion pat terns 
would use the law as a f i r s t resor t . For 
such firms the new legal framework was 
seen rather as a weapon of l a s t r e sor t , 
and not as a subs t i tu t e for responsible 
industrial relations policies on the part 
of management, or as a way of achieving an 
easy l i f e in dealing with trade unions. 
The general expectation was that the Acts 
would be used by small firms who did not 
wish t o a b i d e by t h e e s t a b l i s h e d 
indus t r i a l r e l a t i ons conventions of the 
indus t r ies in which they operated or had 
newly entered. Developments in the coal 
d i s p u t e a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s 
expectation. Many large organisations 
enjoying good re la t ionships with the i r 
t r ade unions have been a f fec ted by 
breaches of the Employment Acts during the 
mining dispute. They have preferred not 
to put these a t r i s k by under taking 
a c t i o n s whose consequences for the i r 
future industrial relations are uncertain 
and unpredictable. They have preferred to 
minimise uncertainty. The use of the 
Employment Acts in the dispute has been by 
small road haulage companies which do not 
necessarily wish a continuing relationship 
with trade unions and which may have had 
to resor t to law to protect the future of 
t h e i r bus inesses given t h e i r over-
dependence on a small number of contracts. 
The NCB has been unwilling to use the Acts 
because to have done so might possibly 
have cemented the strike. Working miners, 
in areas like Nottinghamshire, might have 
seen NCB action as an a t tack on the i r 
union and thus changed the i r a t t i t ude to 
the stoppage. 20? of the NUM membership 
have refused to join the s t r i k e , arguing 
that there should f i r s t be a national 
bal lo t on the issue. Had the NCB gone 
ahead with the s e q u e s t r a t i o n of the 
Yorkshire area asse ts in March, the NUM 
might have held a national ba l lo t . This 
could well have been carr ied in such 
circumstances since i t might have been 
viewed not as a s t r ike ba l lo t but rather 
as a t e s t of loyalty between the union or 
the employer. A successful national 
strike ballot would have shut down all the 
coalf ie lds and increased the cost of the 
strike to the NCa The risk to the NCB of 
using the secondary picketing provisions 
was considered a potentially greater cost 
than not doing so in t h a t i t would 
probably not have had the desired effect. 
In addition there i s also the fact that 
the NCB desires a l a s t ing and long term 
relationship with the NUM and would prefer 
i t s co-operation in the rationalisation of 
t h e i n d u s t r y r a t h e r than f o r c e 
rationalisation upon i t . After the strike 
i s over the two s i d e s have t o l i v e 
t oge the r and a f t e r s t r i k e s a major 
objective of the two sides i s to get back 
to 'normal ' r e l a t i o n s h i p s as soon as 
possible. The use of the law against a 
union always ca r r i es the r isk that i t so 
poisons a t t i t udes tha t i t unnecessarily 
prolongs the period before 'normal ' 
re lat ionshps are resumed with consequent 
detrimental effects on the v i ab i l i t y of 
the enterprise. 
Br i t i sh Rail, the Electr ic i ty Generating 
Board and British Steel were also probably 
unwilling to use the Employment Acts 
because to have done so might possibly 
have resulted in action by the i r own 
workforces in support of the miners 
against the use of l eg i s la t ion which i s 
viewed by trade union a c t i v i s t s as a 
d i rec t at tack on trade unions. These 
companies presumably value their existing 
state of industrial relations and fear the 
use of the law could create unnecessary 
uncertainty in what at present i s seen as 
a generally sa t is factory re la t ionship . 
Like the NCB, they prefer a l a s t i n g 
re la t ionship with the trade unions with 
which they deal. In addition, these firms 
did not need to resor t to the law since 
the police ensured tha t picket l ines did 
not prevent them from receiving necessary 
supplies for their production to continue 
at least at some minimum acceptable level. 
The prime example of t h i s i s the deal 
negotiated between Br i t i sh Steel , the 
Transport & General Workers' Union and the 
Steel unions concerning the levels of coal 
to be allowed into the Ravenscraig s tee l 
works at Motherwell. 
4. Conclusions 
Despite obvious breaches of the Employment 
Acts during the current mining dispute 
there has been l i t t l e attempt by the 
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employers to use these provisions to 
protect themselves a g a i n s t secondary 
picketing and secondary industrial action. 
This i s explained by the fact that most 
f i rms af fec ted have been l a rge wi th 
e s t a b l i s h e d and s t a b l e p a t t e r n s of 
indus t r ia l re la t ions and have managed 
despite the dispute to maintain production 
- at normal levels in some cases and a t 
acceptable minimum levels in others. Such 
firms have f e l t no need to use the Acts 
preferring the cer ta inty of the present 
situation to the possible uncertainties of 
resorting to law. 
I t would, however, be wrong to conclude 
from the events of the mining dispute that 
the new Employment Acts cannot be 
effective. The more plausible conclusion 
is that employers have not seen them as a 
relevant means of dealing with the i r 
immediate problems stemming from tha t 
particular dispute. In a different set of 
circumstances the Employment Acts might 
wel l have been used by the l a r g e 
employers. However, the probabili ty i s 
that such firms, usually characterised by 
stable indus t r ia l r e la t ions and a desire 
to abide by existing IR conventions, would 
resor t to the use of the law only as a 
very las t resort. 
In the coal dispute use of the Acts has so 
far have been by small haulage firms 
dependent upon a l i m i t e d range of 
c o n t r a c t s for s u r v i v a l . When these 
contracts are put in jeopardy use of the 
Employment Acts becomes attractive. Such 
firms are more l ike ly to believe that i f 
the laws are not there they will always be 
'crushed* by unions and tha t i f they do 
not use the laws this will happen to every 
other small employer challenged by a 
powerful union. For such firms the law i s 
viewed as the only means of redress and 
defence. I t i s here that the potent ial 
dangers of the well-meaning but i l l -
thought-out Employment Acts a r i s e in 
allowing small unrepresentative employers 
to push the i r own economic advantage at 
the expense of the best t r ad i t ions of 
industrial relations in the industries in 
which they operate. No way was t h i s 
be t te r i l l u s t r a t ed than in the dispute 
between the National Craphical Association 
and the Messenger Group of Newspapers.* 
* For a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e 
imp l i ca t i on of t h i s d i spu te see J 
Gennard (1984) , "The Implications of 
the Messenger Newspaper Group Dispute" 
Industrial Relations Journal Autumn. 
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